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Enforcement Under the UCCC
I. INTRODUCTION
The draftsmen of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code
(UCCC) apparently reached the conclusion that a statute of such
wide scope would be totally ineffective unless adequate enforce-
ment provisions were included. Consequently, the UCCC con-
tains enough tools to allow the injured consumer to obtain re-
dress for his grievances from the transgressive creditor. It is
the intent of this section of the Symposium to present a com-
parative analysis of the enforcement provisions for credit trans-
actions under the UCCC and under present Minnesota law.
To understand the array of enforcement provisions in the
UCCC, the draftsmen's underlying assumptions must be consid-
ered. Past experience has shown that small recoveries, consumer
ignorance and the high cost of attorneys' fees make dependence
upon private remedies such as civil suits inadequate to deal with
the problems of protecting the vast majority of consumers.' Al-
lowing larger civil recoveries is not a viable solution. It would
merely stimulate creditors, who are relatively more affluent than
consumers, to fight consumers' suits more vigorously thereby
increasing the cost of prosecuting and defending consumer suits.
Facing such opposition may compel the consumer to decide that
the risk involved-he must pay his own attorneys' fees should he
lose-is too great and he may forego a valid civil remedy. In-
creasing criminal penalties is another possibility. Such penalties
are not inherently ineffective because criminal prosecution or the
threat of it should theoretically provide any creditor with the
requisite incentive to comply. Practically speaking, however,
this incentive is not provided by statutory criminal sanctions be-
cause district attorneys do not like to prosecute taxpaying, po-
litically aware businessmen over matters which involve such
technical wrongs as often occur in UCCC violations. 2 One com-
mentator who considered this problem concluded:
Yet, even when a law enforcement official believes that a partic-
ular scheme has been made actionable by statute, he often does
not prosecute because of a widely held belief that, except in the
most egregious circumstances, fraudulent operators should not
1. See Warren, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 24 Bus. LAW.
209, 213-14 (1968); Rice, Remedies, Enforcement Procedvres and the
Duality of Consumer Transaction Problems, 48 BosT. U. L. REv. 559, 567
(1968); Jordan & Warren, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 68
COLUM. L. REV. 387, 422 (1968).
2. Jordan & Warren, supra note 1, at 418.
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be treated like criminals. Lawyers, business leaders and prose-
cutors have stated that "judges, juries and district attorneys do
not like to put businessmen in jail." One district attorney, when
asked by the attorney general to prosecute an alleged fraudulent
operator, retorted: 'I can't even get a conviction when they
stick a gun in somebody's back, how can I get one when they
just talk him out of his money?"
In addition, in the relatively few cases where convictions
are obtained, many of the violators receive exceedingly mild
treatment.3
To solve the problem of providing sufficient consumer pro-
tection without drastically increasing the cost of credit, the
draftsmen chose to provide for an administrator as the nucleus
of the enforcement provisions. 4 As such, this administrator is
given an assortment of legal means of enforcement so that he can
have the necessary flexibility to cope with the schemes of ingeni-
ous creditors with effective legal authority as well as the ability
to use informal methods gently to coax violators into compliance.
These devices range from the moderate "Assurance of Discontin-
uance" provision 5 to the revocation of a supervised lender's 1i-
cense. 6 These enforcement powers, if used diligently and force-
fully, should be sufficient to assure substantial compliance with
the UCCC's provisions. Nevertheless, the enforcement provided
by this administrative nucleus cannot be expected to guarantee
that specific consumers will not be harmed.
3. Note, Translating Sympathy for Deceived Consumers into Ef-
fective Programs for Protection, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 395, 426-27 (1966).
4. "The draftsmen of the UCCC have been quite explicit in their
preference for enforcement through a public agency rather than
throughaction by private individuals." Spanogle, Why Does the Pro-
posed Uniform Consumer Credit Code Eschew Private Enforcement?, 23
Bus. LAw. 1039 (1968).
5. The "Assurance of Discontinuance" provision may be used
when it is claimed that a person has violated an order of a court or the
Administrator. The Administrator may then accept an assurance in
writing from the violator that he will not engage in the conduct in the
future. If the violator fails to comply with the terms of the assurance,
the assurance will be evidence that prior to signing it he engaged in
the conduct described in the assurance. UCCC § 6.109.
6. UCCC § 3.504. A supervised lender is a person authorized to
make or take assignments of a regulated loan in which the loan finance
charge exceeds 18 percent per year as determined according to the pro-
visions on loan finance charges for consumer loans found in section 3.201.
UCCC § 3.501.
The licenses of supervised financial organizations-those presently
organized, chartered or holding an authorization certificate under the
laws of Minnesota or of the United States which authorize the per-
son to make loans and to receive deposits, including savings, share,
certificate or deposit accounts, and those which are subject to super-
vision by an official or agency of Minnesota or of the United States
(UCCC § 1.391(7) )-will continue to be regulated by the agencies
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Several justifications have been advanced for retention of
enforcement power in positions outside the enforcement agency,
while still providing for strong administrative enforcement.
First, there is the possibility that the agency may become overly
sympathetic to the regulated industry and may not, therefore, be
sufficiently aggressive in carrying out its duties. Next, an ave-
nue should be left open for individual consumers who wish to
control their own lawsuits. Also, a consumer may wish to press
a suit which the agency considers to be marginal based on its
budget allocations." In addition to the justifications mentioned
above, the UCCC's provision of private avenues of enforcement
may become more important as the trend toward provision of
more legal services to the poor and greater use of the class action
continues. Allowance of attorneys' fees for victorious plaintiffs
will also aid the debtor who strikes out on his own to secure his
due remedy.8 Thus, these aids to the private enforcer are a hedge
against the possibility of an industry dominated, complacent or
inept administrative agencyY The UCCC, therefore, provides a
set of civil and criminal penalties to revolve around the admin-
istrator's enforcement activities and in addition provides means
for relief in the individual cases where the administrative sur-
veillance has not prevented an unscrupulous creditor from taking
advantage of an individual consumer.
II. PRIVATE CIVIL REMEDIES
The UCCC, primarily in Article 5, Part 2, provides remedies
which may be asserted by the individual consumer on his own
behalf to obtain retribution for violations of the Code. These
remedies may be divided into four categories: (1) remedies for
presently governing them. The licenses of such lenders may also be
revoked under present Minnesota law. (See text accompanying foot-
notes 107-11 infra). As Administrator under the UCCC, the Commis-
sioner of Banks will be the licensor of almost all "supervised financial
organizations" as well as licensor of all "supervised lenders." Thus it
can be expected that he will apply similar discretion in determining the
circumstances under which revocation of a lender's license will be used
as a means of enforcement.
7. See Spanogle, supra note 4, at 1039-41 for a discussion of thesejustifications.
8. Dunham, Unconscionable Conduct and the Uniform Consumer
Credit Code, 23 J. FIN. 312, 316-17 (1968).
9. Contra, Shay, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code: An Econo-
mist's View, 54 CoRNELL L. Rzv. 491, 519-20 (1969). Shay argues that
due to the alienation and lack of self confidence among the urban poor-
the group which is in greatest need of protection-the self-help meas-
ures of the UCCC will not be utilized by them.
[Vol. 55:572
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violations of contract provisions; (2) remedies for excess charges;
(3) remedies for disclosure violations, and (4) remedies for vio-
lations of the licensing provisions. An important, but easily over-
looked, point is that the UCCC provides relatively short statutes
of limitations for bringing these suits. The time allowed for
these suits is usually one or two years,10 which makes necessary
fairly prompt action following a violation. However, all civil
remedies and refunds may be set off against the debtor's obliga-
tion without regard to the statute of limitations and may be
raised as a defense at any time to any suit on the obligation."
In essence, then, there is no limitation on the time when these
rights may be asserted to avoid payment on the obligation. This
provision is necessary to protect the consumer who, unaware of
his rights, fails to seek legal advice until he is sued by the cred-
itor. Such a debtor, however, still has a right to receive attor-
neys' fees even though the statute has run.1 2
A. CONTRACT PROVISION VIOLATIONS13
A creditor may not take a negotiable instrument other than
a check under the UCCC as evidence of the buyer or lessee's ob-
ligation in a consumer credit sale or consumer lease." For vio-
lating this provision a creditor may be held liable for civil dam-
ages.' 5 Similar liabilities attach to a creditor who violates the
limitations on the schedule of payment or loan terms for "regu-
lated loans."' 6 The debtor, under these circumstances, need not
pay the credit service charge or the loan finance charge which
he owes to the creditor. The debtor, in addition, may recover
a penalty to be determined by the court, but not to exceed three
10. UCCC § 5.202(1), for example, allows one year to bring a suit
after the due date of the last scheduled payment of the agreement in-
volved.
11. UCCC § 5.205.
12. UCCC § 5.202(8) allows the court to award attorneys' fees
"[i]n any case in which it is found that a creditor has violated this
Act .. "
13. See Note, Limitations on Creditors' Practices and Remedies
Under the UCCC, 55 MINN. L. REv. 544 (1971).
14. UCCC § 2.403. This section does not include sales or leases
primarily for agricultural purposes.
15. UCCC § 5.202 (1). A holder in due course without notice of the
violatiozn, however, is not subject to the penalties.
16. UCCC § 5.202(1) provides the same penalty for violations of
UCCC § 3.511 which deals with the limitations on schedule payments
and loan terms. A "regulated loan" is a consumer loan in which the
rate of the loan finance charge exceeds ten percent per year calculated
on the unpaid balances of the principal according to the actuarial
method. UCCC § 3.591(1).
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times the amount of the credit service charge or the loan finance
charge.17 The statute of limitations bars any action one year
after the last scheduled payment of the regulated loan agree-
ment.'8 If the creditor can prove by a preponderance of evi-
dence that his violation of the provisions relating to regulated
loans was unintentional or the result of a bona fide error, no lia-
bility results.19
At present, the only Minnesota law comparable to the above
remedies for unfair consumer credit contract provisions concern-
ing regulated loans is the unconscionable contract section of the
Uniform Commercial Code.20  Under this statute contract pro-
visions must be so unfair as to affront ordinary standards of fair-
ness and justice existing within the business credit community.
If the debtor meets this section's difficult burden of proof, the
court may (1) refuse to enforce the unconscionable part of the
contract, (2) enforce the parts not unconscionable, or (3) revise
the contract to make it fair. The successful debtor has no right to
damages or reimbursement for attorneys' fees as he does under
the UCCC. The Uniform Commercial Code's unconscionability
section, however, covers a much wider scope of contract viola-
tions than just regulated loans. These loans are specifically reg-
ulated under the UCCC because they involve interest charges in
excess of ten percent.2 1 The theory of the UCCC apparently is
that creditors allowed to charge such rates should be held to a
higher standard of responsibility for violating its terms.
Any unconscionable contract provisions outside the scope of
the regulated loan sections discussed above would fall under the
unconscionable contract section of the UCCC 2 2 which is derived
17. UCCC § 5.202(1).
18. Id. This starting date for the running of the statute could
allow as much as four years and one month in which to bring suit in-
volving a regulated loan because a maximum contract period of 37
months is allowed.
19. UCCC § 5.202(7).
20. MINN. STAT. § 336.2-302 (1969):
Unconscionable Contract or Clause(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract to have
been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may
refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the re-
mainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause
as to avoid any unconscionable result.(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the con-
tract or any clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties
shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence
as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court
in making the determination.
21. UCCC § 3.501(1).
22. UCCC § 5.108.
[Vol. 55:572
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in large part from the Uniform Commercial Code and is almost
identical to it. Thus, the combination of these two provisions
relating to contract violations and the UCCC's unconscionable
contract section would give more consumer credit protection in
terms of available remedies than are presently provided by the
Uniform Commercial Code's unconscionable contract section
alone. The UCCC leaves out the word "commercial" before the
phrase ". . setting, purpose and effect. . ." in its version of the
-clause.23 This section's comment states that the deletion concern-
ing the evidence as to the contract's setting, purpose and effect
was intentional. The reason for the deletion was that, "unlike
the UCC, [the UCCC's section] is concerned only with transac-
tions involving consumers, and the relevant standard of conduct
for purposes of [the UCCC] is not that which might be accepta-
ble as between knowledgeable merchants but rather that which
measures acceptable conduct on the part of a businessman toward
a consumer."2 4 This position is supported by the fact that the
UCCC version of the section adds the words, "[w] ith respect to a
consumer credit sale, consumer lease, or consumer loan . .
to the language of the Uniform Commercial Code.
This deletion, on the other hand, may have been unnecessary
because a court could view the "commercial setting" as involving
transactions between a businessman and a consumer because that
is what the UCCC deals with. Although no Minnesota case has
interpreted this term, one commentator on the Uniform Commer-
cial Code's unconscionable clause stated, "[D ] espite the language
about commercial setting the application of this section is not
limited to merchants."2 5 Thus, while it appears that the UCCC's
unconscionability clause is more limited in scope, its measure of
acceptable conduct is more stringent. Minnesota law concerning
contract provisions, for these reasons, would be changed by the
adoption of the UCCC.
The UCCC also allows a private remedy for agreements in-
volving extortionate extensions of credit by providing that they
are unenforceable.2 This is a significant section because it is
intended to facilitate federal prosecutions for making extortion-
23. UCCC § 5.108 (2).
24. UCCC § 5.108, Comment 1.
25. Minish, The Uniform Commercial Code in Minnesota: Articles
2 and 6-Sales and Bulk Transfers, 50 M1N. L. Rsv. 103, 113 (1965).
26. That is, those where force is threatened at the time of the
agreement. UCCC § 5.107.
27. UCCC § 5.107.
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ate extensions of credit.28 It should also be noted that this sec-
tion's application is not limited to consumer credit transactions.
Its importance is magnified in view of the fact that Minnesota
repealed its extortion laws in 196329 and now depends upon fed-
eral action against extortion.
B. EXCESsIVE CHARGES
The UCCC provides the debtor with private civil remedies
if excessive interest rates are charged by unscrupulous creditors.
If a creditor violates the rate provisions of the Code, the debtor
has a right to a refund of the excess charge.30 He may also as-
sert this remedy against an assignee who attempts to collect the
debt directly or who tries to enforce rights arising under the
debt. This remedy may be criticized because it gives the creditor
insufficient incentive to adhere to the UCCC requirements. Suc-
cessful assertion of the remedy only forces the creditor to give
back that which he originally had no right to expect. Thus, he
may gain an illegally excessive interest charge if undetected or
unprosecuted, whereas he does not lose the allowable rate if he
is successfully sued by the consumer.
The UCCC alleviates this problem by providing that if the
creditor refuses to grant the refund within a reasonable time he
is subject to a court imposed civil penalty.31 This penalty may
be set by the court at an amount not exceeding the credit service
charge or ten times the amount of the excess charge.3 2  This
penalty will only have the desired effect of ensuring compliance
if the amount imposed exceeds the credit service charge. At any
lower penalty, the guilty creditor will not be forced to pay the
penalty with cash out of his pocket. Instead, his only loss will be
the credit service charge or the opportunity cost of not being able
to invest his money profitably for the duration of the loan. The
sections of the UCCC relating to remedies for excess charges are
28. One of the elements required by the FCCPA for a prosecution
for extortionate extensions of credit is that "the repayment of the ex-
tension of credit ... would be unenforceable, through civil judicial
processes against the debtor ... in the jurisdiction in which the
debtor ... resided. . . ." 18 U.S.C. § 892(b) (1) (Supp. V, 1969).
29. MnqN. STAT. § 621.14 (1969).
30. UCCC § 5.202(3).
31. UCCC § 5.202(4). The penalty is not to exceed "the greater of
either the amount of the credit service or loan finance charge or ten
times the amount of the excess charge." This penalty may not be
imposed if the same creditor has paid a similar penalty assessed in a
civil action brought by the Administrator under section 6.113.
32. UCCC § 5.202 (4).
[Vol. 55:572
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similar to those for the violation of contract provisions relating
to regulated and supervised loans in that they provide that a
good faith error on the part of the creditor will relieve him of
liability and a successful debtor may recover his attorneys' fees.3
3
Minnesota law provides a larger civil remedy for violation of
its usury statute than the UCCC does for excess charges. The
Minnesota usury statute allows the debtor to recover from the
creditor the full amount of interest or premium paid3 4 and fur-
ther provides that all usurious contracts are void except as to
bona fide purchasers of negotiable paper.35 The declaration that
usurious contracts are void gives a significant windfall to the
debtor who can prove that a loan is usurious because "[the guilty
party] must lose not only the interest on the money risked, but
also the principal, including as well all security given to secure
performance. ' 3 6 Although a greater recovery is allowed by this
statute than under the UCCC, the usury statute in Minnesota
has been restricted in its application as a result of the erosion by
exception since its enactment.3 7 The UCCC's excess charge pro-
vision, in comparison, concerns a more comprehensive variety
of consumer credit transactions-any transaction involving a
charge in excess of that allowed by the UCCC.38 The UCCC also
provides an additional penalty if the creditor fails to refund the
excess promptly. Such a penalty is absent from the present Min-
nesota usury statute.3 9 In conclusion, Minnesota law presently
provides a larger remedy for excess charges than the UCCC.
Nevertheless, the limited application of this larger reward re-
stricts its significance as a consumer protection device.
C. DISCLOSURE VIOLATION REMIIEs
The debtor may rescind within three days of the transaction
or of the delivery of the disclosures required by the UCCC any
'consumer credit sale or consumer loan with respect to which a
security interest is retained or acquired in an interest in land" to
33. UCCC § 5.202(7) & (8).
34. MATNN. STAT. § 334.02 (1969). This does not really give the
debtor much because the statute requires that one-half of the amount
recovered be paid for the use of common schools in the county where
it is collected.
35. MImN. STAT. § 334.03 (1969).
36. Midland Loan Finance Co. v. Lorentz, 209 Minn. 278, 287,
296 N.W. 911, 915 (1941).
37. See discussion in Note, Rate Regulation Under the UCCC, 55
MNN. L..REv. 525, 531-36(1971).
38. UCCC § 5.202(3).
39. MIm. STAT. § 621.14 (1969).
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be used as the buyer's home.4 0 This section is derived directly
from the FCCPA41 and is intended to meet the state law exemp-
tion provision of that Act. The only significant deviation from
the Federal Act is the inclusion of any "consumer credit sale or
consumer loan" instead of "consumer credit transaction" in the
FCCPA. This difference could be interpreted to mean that the
Federal Act has a wider scope than the UCCC.42 The better in-
terpretation is that the scope is the same. 43
Violations of the UCCC's disclosure provisions on transac-
tions other than those in regard to a sale of land to be used for a
home discussed above and the provisions on advertising also
carry substantial penalties. 44 These penalties are substantially
similar to those set forth in the FCCPA45 in an effort to meet that
Act's exemption requirements.4 6 Thus adoption of the UCCC in
Minnesota would not change existing Minnesota law with respect
to penalties for violation of disclosure requirements.
D. LICENSING VIOLATION REIVIEDIES
Violation of the licensing provisions of the UCCC invokes
rather harsh penalties. A debtor who is given a supervised loan
from an unlicensed supervised lender, i.e., a lender who charges
a loan finance charge in excess of 18 percent, but who is not au-
thorized to charge such rates, 47 is not obligated to repay either
40. UCCC § 5.204(1).
41. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (Supp. V, 1969). This section contains lan-
guage which is substantially the same as UCCC § 5.204 (1).
42. For example, UCCC section 2.106 defines a "Consumer Lease."
Apparently this would not be covered under UCCC section 5.204(1),
but would be included in the FCCPA's "consumer credit transaction."
43. See UCCC § 2.407 which says that a lessor cannot take a se-
curity interest in the property of the lessee to secure a debt arising
from the lease. In addition, the UCCC provision must be at least as
broad as the Federal Act to gain exemption. The UCCC's draftsmen
were cognizant of this fact and thus it would not make sense to assume
that they drafted a provision knowing that it would be inoperative.
44. These disclosure provisions are contained in Part 3 of Article
2-Credit Sales-and Article 3-Loans. Liability is a sum "twice the
amount of the credit service or loan finance charge in connection with
the transaction, but the liability pursuant to this paragraph shall not
be less than $100 or more than $1,000 . . . ." UCCC § 5.203(1) (a).
45. 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (Supp. V, 1969). This section is substantially
similar to the UCCC provision imposing penalties for disclosure viola-
tions-UCCC § 5.203 (1).
46. It is interesting to note that the UCCC provides substantially
larger remedies in those provisions which closely follow the FCCPA
than it does for those provisions which are not derived from the
FCCPA.
47. UCCC § 3.501 (3) & (4) and § 3.502.
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ENFORCEMENT
the principal or the loan finance charge and the loan is void.48
At first glance this rather severe penalty seems inconsistent with
the UCCC's policy of not depending heavily on licensing provi-
sions for enforcement, imposing only relatively lenient licensing
requirements. The comments do not explain this apparent con-
tradiction. A probable explanation is that since the UCCC only
requires licensing of those lenders who may charge interest rates
in excess of 18 percent, i.e., supervised lenders,49 the draftsmen
may have felt that a person making loans without a license for
such high rates must be dealt with severely. Another explana-
tion may be that this minimal licensing is, nevertheless, impor-
tant to the Administrator because it tells him which institu-
tions engage in making supervised loans. If such institutions re-
main unlicensed, the administration of the UCCC will break
down. Some temperance against the severity of this penalty ex-
ists in the provision which states that no liability may be imposed
if the creditor proves by a preponderance of the evidence that
the violation is unintentional or the result of a bona fide mis-
take.50
Minnesota law does not mete out such severe civil remedies
as does the UCCC for all failures to comply with the state's li-
censing requirements. Seven different types of lenders are re-
quired to be licensed in Minnesota5 ' and the civil remedies for
violation are not uniform among them.
That uniformity is lacking is readily apparent from a look
at the remedies provided for each of the institutions. A loan
from an unlicensed small loan company is void under state law
and the lender has no right to collect or receive any principal,
interest or other charges whatsoever.52 This provision is almost
identical to the remedy provided under the UCCC for unlicensed
supervised lenders. The probable reason for this is that small
loan companies may charge the highest rates allowable by any
institution in Minnesota. Lenders engaged in sales financing of
motor vehicle loans also face a liability similar to that provided
48. UCCC 3 5.202 (2).
49. UCCC § 3.502.
50. UCCC § 5.202(7).
51. They are (1) the small loan companies, MINN. STAT. ch. 56;
(2) lenders engaged in sales financing of motor vehicle loans, MDIN.
STAT. §§ 168.66-.77; (3) industrial loan and thrift companies, Mnm.
STAT. ch. 53; (4) investment and loan companies, MnN. STAT. ch.
54; (6) credit unions, Mn'iN. STAT. ch. 52, and (7) savings banks,
MnW. STAT. ClIL 50.
52. MAwN. STAT. § 56.19 (1969).
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in the UCCC for unlicensed supervised lenders. If the lender
intentionally violates the licensing requirements, the buyer may
assert his right to liquidated damages. The buyer may recover,
set off or counterclaim in any action by the violator to enforce
the contract, an amount as liquidated damages equal to the whole
amount of the contract due and payable, plus reasonable attor-
neys' fees.53 This remedy is slightly different than that allowed
against unlicensed small loan companies and is difficult to ex-
plain or justify.
The inconsistency of Minnesota's remedies in this area is in-
creased when it is noted that no civil remedies are available
against unlicensed industrial loan and thrift companies,5 4 invest-
ment and loan companies,55 savings associations,5 6 credit unions 7
and savings banks.5 8 Although it may be possible to develop an
explanation for the severe civil penalties imposed on small loan
and motor vehicle finance companies vis-a-vis none for the other
five types of consumer credit institutions in Minnesota with re-
gard to violation of their licensing requirements, in the final
analysis the correct conclusion seems to be that these statutes are
indefensibly inconsistent. Unjustified inconsistencies of remedy
for seemingly similar violations such as those discussed above for
the seven institutions in Minnesota presumptively exemplifies
one of the motives for drafting the UCCC. Yet, ironically, adop-
tion of the UCCC will not completely solve the problem of di-
verse remedies for licensing requirement violations under Minne-
sota law. This results from the UCCC's provision that a super-
vised financial organization59 need not obtain a license from the
Administrator before engaging in the business of making super-
vised loans6 ° because those organizations will continue to be reg-
ulated by the agencies presently regulating them. 1 This is an
important limitation on the Administrator's licensing powers and
on the UCCC's appeal as a means of bringing logical consistency
53. MiNN. STAT. § 168.75(b) (1969).
54. MINN. STAT. ch. 53 (1969).
55. MINN. STAT. ch. 54 (1969).
56. MTINI. STAT. ch. 41A (1969).
57. MINN. STAT. ch. 52 (1969).
58. MINN. STAT. ch. 50 (1969).
59. See note 6 supra for the definition of a "supervised financial
organization" under the UCCC.
60. UCCC § 3.502. "Unless a person is a supervised financial or-
ganization or has first obtained a license from the Administrator au-
thorizing him to make supervised loans, he shall not engage in the busi-
ness of (1) making supervised loans .... .
61. See note 6 supra.
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and uniformity to Minnesota's licensing enforcement provisions.
It is an inconsistency which would be remedied most easily by
making the UCCC's licensing provisions applicable to all lenders.
It would not change the number of licensed institutions because
by definition all supervised financial organizations are already i-
censed.62 This remedy would, however, have the twofold ad-
vantage of providing uniform licensing requirements as well as
uniform enforcement provisions to all supervised financial or-
ganizations and supervised lenders.
III. CRIMINAL REMEDIES
The UCCC provides criminal penalties for specified viola-
tions.63 These criminal remedies may also be divided into the
familiar categories of contract provision violations, excess
charges, disclosure violations and licensing violations. By com-
parison, the UCCC imposes criminal penalties for a greater num-
ber of violations than Minnesota law, but the Code's penalties
are not as severe as the few instances of criminal sanctions under
state law.
A. CONTRACT PROVISION VIOLATIONS
Neither the UCCC nor Minnesota law imposes criminal pen-
alties for violations of the contract provision requirements. The
reason is apparently that violation of contract provision require-
ments can best be dealt with through civil remedies. As a result,
enactment of the UCCC would not change existing state law in
this area.
B. ExcEssnm CHARGES
The UCCC provides that a supervised lender who willfully
charges unlawfully high rates is guilty of a misdemeanor and
may be fined in an amount to be determined by the individual
states and/or sentenced to prison for a period not to exceed one
year.64 This penalty need only be applicable against supervised
lenders charging excess rates because a person cannot make su-
pervised loans unless he is a supervised financial organization or
has obtained license to do so from the Administrator. 5 Thus,
62. Id.
63. See UCCC, Article 5, Part 3.
64. UCCC § 5.301(1). The house version of the bill in the 1969
Minnesota Legislature proposed the penalty to be a fine not exceeding
$100 and/or imprisonment for a period not to exceed 90 days. H.F. No.
430, J. of the House 10-102, Tuesday, May 13, 1969 (91st day).
65. UCCC § 3.502.
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lenders other than supervised lenders which charge excessive
rates would be subject to the sanctions set out in the UCCC for
unlicensed supervised lenders60 or to those of supervised lend-
ing organizations. 6 7 Minnesota does not presently impose any
criminal penalty upon creditors for charging excessive finance
fees. Such penalties are advisable, however, because they furnish
a powerful enforcement device that can be used to deal with the
persistent violator.
C. DISCLOSURE VIOLATIONS
The UCCC criminal sanctions for violation of its disclosure
requirements are identical to those presently applicable to Min-
nesota lenders under the FCCPA.0 8 These statutes impose a fine
of up to $5,000 and/or imprisonment up to one year for willful and
knowing violation of these provisions. Again this penalty is
more severe than most in the UCCC because its draftsmen were
trying to parallel the Federal Statute.
D. LICENSING VIOLATIONS
Criminal sanctions may be imposed under the UCCC for will-
ful failure to obtain a license to engage in supervised lending.0 9
Such violations constitute a misdemeanor punishable by a fine
to be determined by each state and/or imprisonment for up to
one year.70
Minnesota law in this regard does not presently exhibit any
uniformity remotely approximating that found in the UCCC.
First, only three of the seven types of licensed lenders may be
criminally penalized for unlicensed operation. Violation of the
Small Loan Company Act's licensing requirements is a gross mis-
demeanor.7 1 Violation of the Motor Vehicle Licensing Act's pro-
visions is also a gross misdemeanor with punishment of a fine not
exceeding $500 and/or imprisonment not to exceed one year.72
Anyone operating as an investment and loan company without a
license is guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction is subject
to a fine of not less than $100 nor more than $1,000 and/or im-
66. UCCC § 5.202(2).
67. See note 6 supra.
68. UCCC § 5.302; 15 U.S.C. § 1611 (Supp. V., 1969).
69. UCCC § 5.301(2).
70. The house version of the UCCC in the 1969 Minnesota
Legislature set the maximums at $100 for the fine and 90 days imorison-
ment. H.F. No. 430, J. of the House 10-102, Tuesday, May 13, 1969 (91st
day.)
71. Mnv,. STAT. § 56.19 (1969).
72. MINN. STAT. § 168.75(a) (1969).
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prisonment of not less than three months nor more than one
year.7 3 No criminal penalties are imposed on unlicensed indus-
trial loan and thrift companies, building and loan companies,
credit unions or savings banks.74 No logical explanation can be
found for these variations.
As discussed previously,75 adoption of the UCCC in its pres-
ent form would not remedy these inconsistencies. All supervised
financial organizations would continue to be governed by their
present licensing provisions under the UCCC.76 This is another
reason the amendment to the UCCC suggested earlier should be
implemented.77
IV. ADMINISTRATION
The civil and criminal penalties discussed above are not
meant to be the sole means of preventing violation of the UCCC's
provisions. They are only meant to supplement78 the activities
of the administrative enforcement body which has the primary
obligation to provide constant surveillance over consumer credit
transactions. Private civil and criminal penalties alone are inad-
equate because the individual consumer may be too poor or too
uninformed to assert them and a busy district attorney may
find such white collar crime low on his list of priorities. 70 Addi-
tionally, these remedies tend in many instances to be rather
harsh in comparison with the indiscretion committed. Although
they are a necessary complement to a full arsenal of enforcement
provisions, they are really meant to be a last resort to provide
retribution after the fact when a consumer is harmed. The more
important enforcement devices are those operating before a con-
sumer is harmed which attempt to prevent violations rather than
merely remedy them once a creditor has harmed an individual.
This type of enforcement can be accomplished effectively only by
an agency which has as its goal and purpose the protection of
credit consumers.
A. BAsic ASsum IONS
The UCCC's principal instrument for insuring compliance
with its provisions is the Administrator whose powers, duties and
73. Mnm. STAT. § 54.28 (1969).
74. See notes 54-58 supra.
75. See text accompanying notes 59-62 supra.
76. UCCC § 1.108(4) (b).
77. See text accompanying note 62 supra.
78. See text accompanying notes 7-9 supra.
79. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
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functions are primarily enumerated in Article 6. It is recom-
mended in the UCCC that the Administrator be a single official
or agency, but this is not required if it is not constitutionally
possible in a state. 0 This consolidation of powers is desirable be-
cause it will make communication with the public easier as well
as allowing creditors to look to a single source for advice con-
cerning compliance with the law.
The draftsmen chose to depend on an Administrator as the
primary enforcing agent for several reasons. First, the place-
ment of this responsibility in a single office will lead to a uni-
formity within the state which is impossible under the existing
system.8 ' The present situation is accurately described by the
80. UCCC § 6.103. The house version of the UCCC bill before the
1969 Minnesota Legislature provided that the Commissioner of Banks
would be the Administrator.
81. Enforcement under the FCCPA, for example, will be shared by
at least nine agencies in the following manner:
[T]he Federal Reserve Board [will] be the central agency for
formulating and issuing all substantive regulations on credit
disclosure and advertising. Responsibility for enforcement ...
[is] given to the Federal Trade Commission, except as to those
institutions already subject to the authority of federal super-
visory agencies. Under this exception, the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board will be responsible for the enforcement of those
regulations affecting savings and loan institutions; the Comp-
troller of Currency for national banks, the Federal Reserve
Board itself for state banks which are members of the Federal
Reserve System; and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion for the federally-insured state non-member banks. The
Director of the Bureau of Credit Unions will enforce re-
quirements for federal credit unions. In addition, the Civil
Aeronautics Board or the Federal Aviation Agency, the Inter-
state Commerce Commission and the Department of Agricul-
ture will exercise jurisdiction over the institutions that they
traditionally control.
Note, Securing the Guarantees of Consumer Credit Legislation, 44 Nova.
DAME LAw. 574, 599 (1969). For a discussion of the Federal Trade
Commission's inadequacies as a regulatory agency in this area see id.
at 599-601. See also 15 U.S.C. § 1607 (Supp. V, 1969) for the statutory
basis of this division of powers.
Under the UCCC, the Administrator may exercise all powers
given him by the Act even against "supervised financial organizations"
except for the powers of examination, investigation and administra-
tive enforcement. UCCC § 6.105(1). This exception removes a great
deal of power over "supervised financial organization" from the Ad-
ministrator, but the Administrator will still be able to exercise the
following powers against those organizations: Advising consumers as
to their rights (UCCC § 6.104(1) (b)), establishing programs to educate
consumers (UCCC § 6.104(c)), making studies to effectuate the policies
of the Act (UCCC § 6.104 (d) ), bringing civil actions for injunctions for
violations of this Act (UCCC § 6.110), bringing civil actions for
injunctions against unconscionable agreements and fraudulent or uncon-
scionable conduct (UCCC § 6.111) and bringing civil actions for refund
of excess charges (UCCC § 6.113).
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statement that, "the variegated status of existing regulation is
mirrored in the methods of enforcement authorized in the re-
spective acts. '8 2 Uniformity of consumer credit law within the
state will make credit law more easily understandable to the
average consumer and will thereby lead to better enforce-
ment of the Code. Another justification for the use of an Admin-
istrator is the increased effectiveness that such an agency pro-
vides. In fact, "effective enforcement and, consequently, con-
sumer protection have been provided only where there exists an
aggressive consumer-oriented authority, as under the small loan
statutes. '8 3 A final justification, closely akin to effectiveness, is
the consistency of enforcement provided by a consumer oriented
Administrator. Unlike the district attorney or the state attorney
general, the UCCC Administrator's only task is to enforce the law
relating to consumer credit transactions. His time, focus of inter-
est and constituency are not as diverse and fragmented as the
other aforementioned law enforcement agencies. The Adminis-
trator can uninterruptedly and consistently exert his power and
influence against violators-unlike the district attorney or at-
torney general who is responsible for the enforcement of all other
laws of the state as well as those related to consumer credit
transactions.
The Administrator under the UCCC will take an entirely dif-
ferent approach toward consumer credit protection than the regu-
latory provisions allow under present Minnesota law. Minnesota
presently depends upon licensing and inspection devices to assure
compliance with existing credit laws. It gives an agency, usually
the Commissioner of Banking, the power to grant and revoke li-
censes and to inspect the records of lending institutions. The
Commissioner's primary weapon of enforcement is the threat of
revocation. In some instances, such a threat can be relatively ef-
fective, but its primary fault is that it does not allow much lee-
way for informal administrative enforcement. The reason for
this situation is that revocation of an established lending institu-
tion's license to operate is an extremely severe penalty. Thus,
although revocation may be effective in instances where a cred-
itor commits serious violations, it has little practical effect in
situations where the abuse is small and both the creditor and the
82. Note, supra note 81, at 581. A good discussion of the disparity of
regulation among the different lending institutions is found in Jordan
& Warren, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 68 COLUM. L. REv.
387, 418 (1968).
83. Note, supra note 81, at 587.
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Commissioner realize that revocation is not deserved. 4 It should
be remembered, however, that violations which seem insignifi-
cant when compared with the revocation remedy can result in
severe harm to the individual consumer who does not know of or
cannot afford to pursue a civil recourse. This is the void the
UCCC seeks to fill with the Administrator.
B. FUNCTIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATOR UNDER THE UCCC
1. Jurisdiction
The Administrator will have jurisdiction to assert his au-
thority over all persons who, within the state, "make or solicit
consumer credit sales, consumer leases, consumer loans, con-
sumer related sales . . . and consumer related loans . . . ." or
persons who directly collect payment or enforce their rights
against such debtors.8 5 This grant of jurisdiction is intended to
comprehend every consumer credit related transaction governed
by the UCCC which occurs within the state and is an indication
of the breadth of authority the draftsmen intended the Adminis-
trator to command.
2. Information, Education and Counseling
As part of the UCCC's intent to give the Administrator suf-
ficient informal means to accomplish his task, it provides him
with the power to counsel consumers on their respective rights
and duties,8 6 establish educational programs to enable consumers
to protect themselves8 7 and to make studies of possible im-
provements or additions to the UCCC.88 This will provide a new
source of consumer credit protection to Minnesota citizens be-
cause at present there is no state office with comparable powers.
There are, of course, a number of offices and private groups
which attempt to fulfill this function presently, but they are
sorely inadequate. For example, the state attorney general's of-
fice publishes a weekly newsletter and records two tapes for dis-
tribution to the news media describing one or two consumer
84. The deterrent effect of revocation has not been the most pro-
ductive use for licensing. Instead, licensing has been primarily used
as a means of limiting entry into the credit industry. Jordan & War-
ren, supra note 82, at 419.
85. UCCC § 6.102.
86. UCCC § 6.104(1) (b).
87. UCCC § 6.104(1) (c).
88. UCCC § 6.104(1) (d).
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frauds or fraudulent practices each week.89 These do not always
relate to consumer credit practices and often are not presented
to the public by the news media. The Administrator would have
the necessary informational resources and he would be a central
figure to which people could look for comprehensive information
concerning consumer credit matters.
3. Rule Making
The Administrator is required to adopt rules not inconsist-
ent with the FCCPA to further the goal of that Act-to allow a
prospective debtor to compare more readily the various credit
terms available to him and to avoid the uninformed use of
credit.9 0 This is a significant section because it enables the Ad-
ministrator to modify the law to meet current demands and to
avoid the delay and the difficulty of amendment by legislative
action. The flexibility implicit in this rule making authority is
confined to the extent that any rules promulgated must be in
harmony with the FCCPA if the state is to retain its exemption
from federal regulation.9 1 The UCCC takes cognizance of this
fact by requiring that the Administrator take into consideration
when adopting, repealing or amending rules, the FCCPA and the
regulations adopted by the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve Board.92 To maintain uniformity among the states, the
Administrator is also required to advise and consult with the
Administrators in other jurisdictions which have enacted the
UCCC.9 3 Finally, the Code contains a good faith reliance clause
89. Interview with John Cushman, Assistant Minnesota Attorney
General, in St. Paul, March 2, 1970.
90. The Administrator shall adopt rules not inconsistent with
the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act to assure a mean-
ingful disclosure of credit terms so that a prospective debtor
will be able to compare more readily the various credit terms
available to him and to avoid the uninformed use of credit.
These rules may require disclosure by persons who arrange for
the extension of credit, may contain classifications, differentia-
tions or other provisions, and may provide for adjustments
and exceptions for any class of transactions subject to this Act
which in the judgment of the Administrator are necessary or
proper to effectuate the purposes or to prevent circumvention
or evasion, or to facilitate compliance with, the provisions of this
Act relating to disclosure of credit terms.
UCCC § 6.104(2).
91. "The Board shall by regulation exempt from the requirements
of this part any class of credit transactions within any state if it deter-
mines that under the law of that state that class of transactions is sub-ject to requirements substantially similar to those imposed under this
part, and that there is adequate provision for enforcement." 15 U.S.C.
§ 1633 (Supp. V, 1969).
92. UCCC § 6.104(3).
93. UCCC § 6.104(3) (a) & (3) (b) (ii).
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with regard to acts done or omitted pursuant to a rule of the Ad-
ministrator if that rule is later amended, repealed or found to be
invalid.9 4 The only exception to this provision is that any excess
charge made under the supposed authority of the invalid rule
must be returned to the debtor 5
4. Licensing and Notification
The UCCC does not use licensing as a regulatory device to the
extent it is used under Minnesota state law. Minnesota law uses
licensing primarily for four purposes: (1) the limitation of entry
into the market place; (2) as a basis for providing information to
the regulatory authorities; (3) as a transparent means of raising
revenues to sustain administrative expenses, and (4) as a sanction
for law violations through revocation of licenses."
Under the present regulatory statutes, entry into the market
place is limited by certain findings required to be made by the
Commissioner of Banks before a license may be issued. T  Typi-
cal of this is the small loan company statute which provides that
a license may be issued if the Commissioner finds among other
things "that allowing the applicant to engage in business will
promote the convenience and advantage of the community in
which the business of the applicant is to be conducted . ... "98
The UCCC does not require the Administrator to make findings
in regard to these factors and, thereby, in essence, allows free
entry into the lending industry with the hope of creating greater
competition within the credit industry.9 9 The UCCC depends
upon other means of enforcement to protect the consumer.
The provision allowing freedom of entry10 0 has caused a
94. UCCC § 6.104.
95. Id.
96. "The licensing statutes of the various states serve at least one,
if not all, of these functions." Note, supra note 81, at 581.
97. See savings banks, MINN. STAT. § 56.01; savings associations,
M_.IN. STAT. § 61A.03; credit unions, MINN. STAT. § 52.01(4); industrial
loan and thrift companies, MINN. STAT. § 53.03(2) (Department of
Commerce makes the findings); investment and loan companies,
MINN. STAT. § 54.29; small loan companies, MINN. STAT. § 56.04;
motor vehicle retail installment sales lenders, MINN. STAT. § 168.67 and
MINN. STAT. § 46.04 (1969).
98. MINN. STAT. § 56.04 (1969).
99. The UCCC only requires the Administrator to "make an eval-
uation of the financial responsibility, character and fitness of the appli-
cant." UCCC § 3.503(1).
100. UCCC § 3.503. This provision allows relatively free entry be-
cause it adopts "financial responsibility, character and fitness" for su-
pervised lending licenses rather than the "convenience and advantage"
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great deal of controversy within the credit lending industry. The
small loan companies dislike it because they see it as a threat to
the semi-monopolistic positions which they now enjoy under Min-
nesota's licensing statutes. Retail businesses see it as an oppor-
tunity to get into the loan business. The theory of the UCCC is
that free entry is a necessary corollary to its competitive rate
structure.' 0 Opponents of this provision claim that it will not
work in practice and their position is not without historical sup-
port. The first Uniform Small Loan Acts allowed freedom of
entry in dependence upon competition to keep interest rates low.
Later drafts, however, introduced "convenience and fitness of the
community" as standards to be considered in granting licenses as
well as providing for lower maximum rates.1 02  These changes
were "a reflection of the conclusion ... that competition within
the small loan business was not fully effective.' 0 3  It can be
argued, on the other hand, that it is not fair to compare the
small loan experiment with the UCCC because the latter involves
the entire credit market, whereas the former did not. Consid-
eration should also be given to the fact that the commercial set-
ting is different today than it was forty years ago when the Uni-
form Small Loan Acts were drafted.
Minnesota law presently uses licensing statutes as informa-
tion gathering devices.'0 4 A typical statute is the one concerning
credit unions. It requires that "[e] ach credit union shall an-
nually... file a report with the commissioner of banks ... giv-
ing such relevant information as he may require concerning the
operations during the preceding calendar year."'0 5  The UCCC
contains a similar provision, except that it specifically says the
information contained in the supervised lender's reports will be
confidential and may only be published in composite form.100
test which has often been used to restrict entry in the past. In addi-
tion, it does not require a license to make credit sales.
101. Note, supra note 81, at 586-87.
102. Hubachek, The Development of the Regulatory Small Loan
Laws, 8 LAw AND CONTEZM . PRoBs. 108, 119-23 (1941).
103. Id. at 122.
104. See savings banks, MANN. STAT. § 50.19; savings associations,
MINI. STAT. § 51A.43; credit unions, MINN. STAT. § 52.06; indus-
trial loan and thrift companies, MINN. STAT. § 53.09; investment and
loan companies, MIxN. STAT. § 54.27; small loan companies, MnN.
STAT. § 56.04; motor vehicle retail installment sales lenders, MINN. STAT.
§ 168.70 and Mum. STAT. § 46.04 (1969).
105. MNn. STAT. § 52.06 (1969).
106. UCCC § 3.505(2). Supervised financial organizations, of course,
will continue to file their annual reports after adoption of the UCCC
to the agency that they file them with at present.
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Receipt of information such as this is vital to the effective func-
tioning of the Administrator. This information will allow the
Administrator to make sound proposals for improvements in con-
sumer credit laws as well as to enable him to make needed rules
and regulations.
Licensing requirements are also used as a transparent means
of raising revenues to sustain administrative activities.107 This
is particularly true of Minnesota's present statutes. The Small
Loan statute, for example, requires a $250 initial filing fee and a
$100 annual fee.'0 8 The UCCC does not require any filing fee or
annual fee as a condition of maintaining a license. It does, how-
ever, require any person who engages in making consumer credit
sales, consumer leases, or consumer loans and any person doing
business in the state who takes assignments of and undertakes
direct collection of payments from or enforcement of rights
against debtors arising from those transactions'"° to pay a fee
of $10 per year with his notification to the Administrator that he
is doing such business in the state.1 0 It also requires an annual
payment of $10 for each $100,000 or part thereof, in excess of
$100,000, of the original unpaid balances arising from consumer
credit transactions during a year."' These annual fees can obvi-
ously result in substantial amounts of revenue which can be used
to help pay for the administrative costs of supervising the credit
lending institutions.
Revocation of a lending institution's license is a potential
sanction under both Minnesota law and the UCCC. 112 The Min-
nesota Small Loan Act allows revocation of the license for failure
to pay the annual fee, failure to comply with the provisions of
the statute or for the existence of conditions which would have
been sufficient to deny the original application for a license.'"
Credit unions may be placed in receivership and have their li-
107. See savings associations, MINN. STAT. § 41A.41; industrial loan
and thrift companies, MINN. STAT. § 53.03; investment and loan com-
panies, MINN. STAT. § 54.27; small loan companies, MINN. STAT. §
56.04; motor vehicle retail installment sales lenders, MINN. STAT. § 168.67
(1969).
108. MINN. STAT. § 56.02 (1969).
109. UCCC § 6.201.
110. UCCC § 6.203(1).
111. UCCC § 6.203(2) & (3).
112. See savings banks, MINN. STAT. § 50.22; savings associations,
MINN. STAT. § 51A.05, subd. 5; credit unions, MINN. STAT. § 52.062;
industrial loan and thrift companies, MINN. STAT. § 53.09 (3); small loan
companies, MINN. STAT. § 56.09; motor vehicle retail sales lenders, MINN.
STAT. § 168.68 (1969).
113. MINN. STAT. § 56.09 (1969).
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censes revoked.1 14 Savings banks have a unique enforcement
provision." 5 The statute directs the Commissioner of Banks to
initially give the violator a written order to discontinue the vio-
lation. If this order is not followed, the Commissioner makes a
report and gives it to the attorney general to take appropriate
action.
The UCCC's license revocation provisions appear quite leni-
ent when compared with present Minnesota law. Under the
UCCC the Administrator may issue an order to show cause why
a supervised lender's license should not be revoked or suspended.
This order is followed by a hearing with the maximum revocation
period which may be imposed being six months."06 This period
of revocation may, however, have the same consequences as ab-
solute revocation provided under present Minnesota law. The
loss of business and public faith resulting from even a short revo-
cation may well make it impossible for a lender to recover. The
apparent comparative leniency of the UCCC provision is a fur-
ther indication of its emphasis on forms of enforcement devices
other than licensing requirements as a means of policing the con-
sumer credit industry.
5. Investigatory Powers
A necessary power of any effective enforcement agency is
that of investigation because it gives the agency information
upon which to base its enforcement strategies and also indicates
where its enforcement is most urgently needed. The UCCC gives
the Administrator power to investigate, hold hearings, subpoena
witnesses and compel production of records. This power of in-
vestigation is to be exercised in cooperation with enforcement
agencies and officials presently supervising lending institutions
chartered under the laws of the state or of the United States." 7
The Administrator may, however, exercise this power of investi-
gation only if he has probable cause to believe that a person has
engaged in an act which is subject to action by the Administra-
tor.1"8
It is questionable whether the Administrator should be lim-
ited to making investigations only when he has probable cause to
do so. 1 9 One point is clear, however: This provision will not
114. MImN. STAT. § 52.064 (1969).
115. MnnuN. STAT. § 50.22 (1969).
116. UCOC § 3.504(1).
117. UCCC § 6.105(1), (2) & (3).
118. UCCC § 6.106.
119. Section 6.106 is not intended to give the Administrator a gen-
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provide the Administrator with as much power as the Commis-
sioner of Banks presently may exert. Under present Minnesota
statutes the Commissioner is directed to exercise "constant super-
vision over the books and affairs of financial corporations doing
business in the state."1 20 The present Minnesota Small Loan Act
allows the Commissioner to investigate whenever he desires.
1 2 1
He is given similar powers under the Savings Association Act,'
2 2
the Credit Union Act 123 and the Savings Bank Act.' 24  Thus,
these institutions are subject to more investigation under present
state law than supervised lenders would be under the UCCC.
On the other hand, the Industrial Loan and Thrift Company Act
only requires an annual examination.1 25 The motor vehicle stat-
ute is similar to the UCCC in that it allows the Commissioner
of Banks to investigate a lending institution following the filing
of a complaint.1 26 No logical reason can be discerned for these
various types of investigatory powers under present Minnesota
law. They seem to be more indicative of the vagaries of hap-
hazard legislation than of any well designed system of regulation.
6. Enforcement Powers
The backbone of the Administrator's powers is the enforce-
ment devices given to him in the UCCC. The UCCC gives the
Administrator sufficient power in this area to deal effectively
with the most recalcitrant offender. The first of these powers
is the ability to issue an order to cease and desist from engaging
eral power to investigate in a dragnet manner as is indicated by the
requirement of probable cause. This intent of the draftsmen to so limit
investigations may be circumvented by section 3.506 which allows the
Administrator to
[e]xamine periodically at intervals he deems appropriate the
loans, business, and records of every licensee. In addition, for
the purpose of discovering violations of this Act or securing
information lawfully required, the Administrator or the official
or agency to whose supervision the organization is subject ...
may at any time investigate the loans, business, and records
of any regulated lender.
The fact that it is limited to regulated lenders may mean that the
draftsmen felt that some restraint in the form of a probable cause re-
quirement was needed for investigations of nonregulated lenders but left
regulated lenders to the discretion of the Administrator.
120. MINN. STAT. § 46.04 (1969).
121. MINN. STAT. § 56.10 (1969).
122. MINN. STAT. § 51A.42(3) (1969).
123. MINN. STAT. § 52.06 (1969).
124. MINN. STAT. § 50.19 (1969). The trustees of the bank are re-
quired to file an annual report containing the information required by
the Commissioner of Banks.
125. MINN. STAT. § 53.09 (1969).
126. MINN. STAT. § 169.69 (1969).
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in violations of the Code.127 This order is to be issued following
notice and hearing and becomes enforceable when a judicial en-
forcement order is secured by the Administrator, unless a pro-
ceeding for review is initiated within 30 days after the order is
issued.128
The Administrator may also choose to proceed against a vio-
lator by the use of a civil injunction.1 29 The UCCC also contains
an additional section specifically concerning injunctions against
unconscionable agreements and fraudulent or unconscionable
conduct.130 The Code specifies three situations in which the Ad-
ministrator may seek an injunction against unconscionable con-
duct: (1) making or enforcing unconscionable contract terms or
provisions;13 ' (2) fraudulent or unconscionable inducement to
enter into a consumer credit transaction, 32 and (3) fraudulent or
unconscionable collection of such debts.133 The unconscionable
section further delineates five factors to be considered in its ap-
plication. The fact that the creditor does not believe there is a
reasonable probability of full payment at the time of the giving
of credit indicates that the credit sale is unconscionable. 134
The same result occurs where the seller knows the buyer cannot
receive substantial benefits from the property or services sold.' 3 5
Similarly, the seller's charging prices grossly different than those
readily obtainable by like buyers or lessees indicates unconscion-
able behavior. 3 6 Separate charges for insurance are also to be
considered.' 37 Finally, the UCCC permits consideration to be
taken of the fact that the debtor cannot protect his interests be-
cause of physical or mental infirmities, illiteracy, inability to un-
derstand the language of the agreement and other factors.' 38
127. UCCC § 6.108(1).
128. UCCC § 6.108 (5).
129. UCCC § 6.110.
130. UCCC §§ 6.111 & 6.108 (6).
131. UCCC § 6.111(1) (a).
132. UCCC § 6.111(1) (b).
133. UCCC § 6.111(1) (c).
134. UCCC § 6.111(3) (a).
135. UCCC § 6.111(3) (b). UCCC § 6.111, Comment, Note 3, uses the
example of selling English encyclopedias to Spanish speaking people.
Thus it could be argued that the "substantial benefits" requirement
would not apply to the familiar built-in home vacuum cleaner, the
home fire alarm system or the sale of lifetime encyclopedia yearbook
contracts to elderly people. The Code, on the other hand, does not
rule out these possibilities. Thus, this section could have tremendous
potential as a consumer protection device.
136. UCCC § 6.111(3) (c).
137. UCCC § 6.111(3) (d).
138. UCCC § 6.111(3) (e). The inability to understand the language
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These factors exemplify the UCCC's intent to provide flexible
enforcement devices as well as attempting to control the whole
consumer credit transactional setting rather than just the con-
tract provisions.
Probably the most innovative, significant and potentially ef-
fective enforcement power given to the Administrator is the
power to bring civil actions against creditors on behalf of the
overcharged debtor for making or charging excess rates.l 0 These
actions may be for civil penalties as well as for the refund of the
excess charges. Many debtors who would not otherwise be able
to receive relief because of financial or other reasons 140 will be
greatly benefited by this provision. In essence, it means that no
harmed debtor will be unable to get relief.
This section, in addition, contains the intriguing sentence that,
"an action may relate to transactions with more than one
debtor.' 1 4 1 Some writers have not read this sentence as allowing
the Administrator to bring class actions.1 42 Other writers includ-
ing Professor Robert Braucher, a member of the UCCC's drafting
committee, have expressed a different opinion. His belief is that
''a state administrator is given power . . . to bring class actions
on behalf of consumers."' 43 Class action litigation would allow
the Administrator to bring actions for civil damages in amounts
of sufficient magnitude to make them economically efficient as
well as having a significant deterrent effect upon potentially
unscrupulous lenders.
V. CONCLUSION
The UCCC provides a variety of devices for the protec-
tion of the consumer credit borrower which are flexible and uni-
form to cover violations in a large number of consumer credit
transactions. Yet, as has been indicated at several points in this
of the agreement could significantly impede the insertion of boiler-
plate clauses.
139. UCCC § 6.113(1).
140. For the relatively unsophisticated consumer, particularly
those of modest means, administrative enforcement will provide
their only protection against unscrupulous merchants or lenders.
Such consumers neither will have the means for instituting their
own suits, nor adequate knowledge or experience to enable them
to file a complaint through proper channels to obtain redress
through the Attorney General in a criminal action. H.R. Rep.
No. 1040, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1967).
141. UCCC § 6.113.
142. See Dunham, Unconscionable Conduct and the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 23 J. FIN. 312, 316 (1968).
143. Braucher, Truth in Lending and Truth in Legislation, 37
HEN. LAW. 4 (1969).
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Note, the UCCC has one weakness which would restrict signifi-
cantly the impact that passage of this uniform statute would
have upon present Minnesota law. That weakness is the division
set up between supervised financial organizations, which would
continue to be governed to a great extent by present law, and
supervised lenders, who would be governed primarily by the
Administrator. This would result in a continuance of the present
diverse regulation of consumer credit lenders. Since the Com-
missioner of Banks, who is presently primarily responsible for
enforcement of Minnesota's laws regulating lenders, would be
the Administrator under the UCCC, uniform rules for all lenders
in the areas of licensing requirements and penalties, examination,
investigation and administrative enforcement would be possible
if the Commissioner were allowed to exert the powers provided in
these areas under the UCCC against supervised financial organi-
zations as well as supervised lenders. Acceptance of this modifi-
cation would make the UCCC truly uniform in its application as
well as placing substantially all of the Act's enforcement re-
sponsibility upon the Administrator. Then, the Administrator
would be able to independently assert all of the various enforce-
ment devices provided by the UCCC against all violators in order
to arrest effectively violative activities and fairly and adequately
compensate the harmed debtor.
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